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IPart One of Spinoza’s Ethics does not have any preface.　This fact has been somewhat 
plerplexing to Spinoza scholars because each of the other four parts has an informative preface. 
It is wel known that Part One, hence the whole edifice, of the Ethics begins abruptly with the 
definition of the notion of Causa Sui.
Definitions
I　By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose 
natrue cannot be conceived except as existing. (Curley, p. 408)2)
This definition is prima facie strange, because it seems unnecessary to define the notion of 
Causa Sui.　It is quite clear, at least for the philosophicaly-minded readers of Spinoza’s time, 
that the notion means an eficient cause of itself (causa eficiens sui ipsius) or more lengthily 
that which is efected or produced by itself (id quod a se ipso eficitur sive producitur).　There-
fore we may analyse or rearange the definition in question in the folowing manner.
The definiendum = cause of itself (causa sui).
The implicit definiens = eficient cause of itself (causa eficiens sui ipsius).
The explicit definiens = that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature can-
not be conceived except as existing (id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus 
natura non potest concipi, nisi existens).
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 1) In April of 2008 the Spinoza Society of Japan gave me an occasion to make a speech under the title 
“Tha Causa Sui Controversy and Spinozism” at Osaka University.　This paper is a modified ver-
sion of part of that speech, which was made in Japanese.
 2) The original Latin text (O. L.): “Per causam sui inteligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive 
id, cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens” (G I, p. 45).
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If Spinoza had intended to determine a more or less lexicographical meaning of the defini-
endum in this definition, he should have connected it with the implicit definiens although the 
definition in that case would have not been informative at al. (And in that case, if Spinoza’s 
sense of style had been unable to bear that uninformativeness, he should have omited the defi-
nition after al.) However, the definiendum and the explicit definiens are connected in actual fact.　
Therefore we must say that Spinoza’s intention in this definition was not to explain the meaning 
of the definiendum lexicographicaly.　In other words, the logical status of this definition must 
be considered not as a more or less lexicographical explanation but as an axiom or more specifi-
caly an exposition of a certain metaphysical stance.
My interpretation is that Spinoza intended with the definition of causa sui, that is the very 
first statement in his most important writing, to expose unambiguously his metaphysical posi-
tion regarding the controversy about causa sui, in which several important philosophers or theo-
logians, such as Descartes, Arnauld and Clauberg, engaged from 1640s to 1650s.　To put my 
interpretation diferently, Spinoza was fuly aware that his definition of causa sui should be an 
unambiguous sign of his reaction to the Causa Sui Controversy for the contemporary readers of 
his Ethics.　The aim of this paper is to make this interpretation as persuasive as possible.
II
The notion of Causa Sui was not invented by Spinoza.　He learned it from a controversy 
that took place from 1640s to 1650s about the consistency of the notion Causa Sui and the 
appropriateness of regarding God as Causa Sui.　There were two parties in the controversy.　
In one of them we find René Descartes (1596–1650) and, after Descartes’ death, Johannes Clau-
berg (1622–1665), and in the other Johannes Caterus (c. 1590–1655), Antoine Arnauld 
(1612–1694) and Jacobus Revius (1586–1658).　In this section I wil survey how the contro-
versy was started.
The main text of Descartes’ metaphysical masterpiece Meditations on First Philosophy had 
been completed by the summer of 1640.　Descartes planned to annex to it objections by several 
prominent philosophers or theologians as wel as his replies to them.　As a result, six sets of 
objections and replies were published together with the main text in 1641.
The First Set of Objections was by a Catholic theologian from Holand, Johannes Caterus. 
One of Caterus’ assertions was that the notion “esse a se”, with which Descartes described God 
in his Third Meditation, should be understood not in the positive sense of being caused by himself 
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but in the negative sense of not being caused by anything else.　To this remark Descartes reacts 
sensitively in his First Set of Replies, saying, “I did not say that it was impossible for something 
to be the eficient cause of itself” (CSM I, p. 78)3).　Indeed, Descartes admits that it would be 
trivialy false for something to be the eficient cause of itself as long as the notion of eficient 
causality was to be understood to imply the conditions of temporal succession and numeral 
distinctness of cause and efect.4) But he replies that the notion of eficient causality should not 
be understood to be restricted by those conditions.　According to Descartes, the most important 
point about the notion of eficient causality is the Principle of Eficient Causation, namely: “if 
anything exists we may always ask why it exists; that is, we may inquire into its eficient cause, 
or, if it does not have one, we may demand why it does not need one” (CSM I, p. 78 [AT VI, 
p. 108]).　And this Principle of Eficient Causation is valid universaly, so applicable even to 
God.　Hence Descartes says: “I do readily admit that there can exist something which 
possesses such great and inexhaustible power that it never required the assistance of anything 
else in order to exist in the first place, and does not now require any assistance for its preserva-
tion, so that it is, in a sense, its own cause; and I understand God to be such a thing.” (CSM I, 
p. 78 [AT VII p. 109]).　And he says: “we are quite entitled to think that in a sense he stands 
in the same relation to himself as an aficient cause does to its efect, and hence that he derives 
his existence from himself in the positive sense” (CSM I p. 80 [AT VI p. 111]).
In this way the notion of Causa Sui, which had never been used explicitly in the main text 
of the Meditations, made its first appearance in the First Set of Replies as a description applica-
ble uniquely to God.
III
When Antoine Arnauld wrote the Fourth Set of Objections, he had read not only the main 
text of the Meditations but also the First Set of Replies.　In his objections Arnauld treated 
many subjects, one of which was the problem about the notion of Causa Sui.　I wil survey 
Arnauld’s argument on this problem.
Before Arnauld deals with the appropriateness of regarding God as Causa Sui, he asserts 
that the notion of Causa Sui itself is inconsistent, because he thinks that the notion of eficient 
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 3) O.L.: “non dixi impossibile esse ut aliquid sit causa eficiens sui ipsius” (AT, VI, p. 108).
 4) In this paper the condition of temporal succession of cause and efect shal be abreviated as Tempo-
rality Condition and the condition of numeral distinctness of them as Distinctness Condition.
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cause implies the Distinctness Condition.　“Since every efect depends on a cause and receives 
its existence from a cause, surely it is clear that one and the same thing cannot depend on itself 
or receive its existence from itself.　… a relation must involves two terms.” (CSM II, p. 147 
[AT VI 209–210]).
Arnauld proceeds to criticize Descartes’ assertion that the Principle of Eficient Causation 
is applicable even to God, saying: “… the question of why God should continue in existence 
cannot be asked without absurdity, since the question manifestly involves the notions of 
‘before’ and ‘after’, past and future, which should be excluded from the concept of an infinite 
being” (CMS II, pp. 148–149 [AT VII p. 211]).　Namely, according to Arnauld the eficient 
causality, which should be understood to imply the Temporarity Condition, is in no way applica-
ble to God, a being surpassing the concept of time.　And he adds: “… it belongs to the essence 
of an infinite being that it exists … no less than it belongs to the essence of a triangle to have its 
three angles equal to two right angles” (CMS I, p. 149 [AT VI p. 212]).　In this way Arnauld 
maintains that God’s existence should never be understood in terms of his eficient cause but 
solely in terms of his nature or essence.
And Arnauld concludes his objection against Descartes’ argument about the notion of 
Causa Sui with the folowing harsh sentence: “I am sure that it wil scarecely be possible to find 
a single theologian who wil not object to the proposition that God derives his existence from 
himself in the positive sense, and as it were causaly” (CSM I, p. 150 [AT VI p. 214]).　Thus 
he maintains that in view of the Christian theological orthodoxy it is improper to explain the 
existence of God in terms of eficient causality.
Now Descartes replies to Arnauld’s objections againt the notion of Causa Sui, in many 
pages of the Fourth Set of Replies.　Below I wil extract highly relevant passages from his 
replies.
A M. Arnauld says that it is ‘a hard saying, and indeed false’ to suggest that God is 
the eficient cause of himself; but I actualy denied that suggestion …. (CSM II, p. 
164 [AT VI, p. 235])
B … I did believe in the existence of something that does not need an eficient cause.　
And what could that be, but God? (CSM I, p. 165 [AT VI, p. 236])
C … the inexhaustible power of God is the cause or reason for his not needing a 
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cause.　And since that inexhaustible power or immensity of the divine essence is as 
positive as can be, I said that the reason or cause why God needs no cause is a posi
tive reason or cause. (CSM I, p. 165 [AT VI, p. 236])
D I hope that even M. Arnauld wil not deny that the immensity of the power in virtue 
of which God needs no cause in order to exist is a positive thing in God, and that noth-
ing which is similarly positive can be understood to exist in any other thing in such a 
way that it does not need an eficient cause in order to exist. (CSM II, p. 165 [AT 
VI, p. 237])
E The fact that the second restriction [= the Distinctness Condition] cannot also be 
deleted implies merely that a cause which is not distinct from its efects is not an efi-
cient cause in the strict sense, and this I admit.　It does not, however, folow that 
such a cause is in no sense a positive cause that can be regarded as analogous to an 
eficient cause; and this is al that my argument requires. (CSM I, p. 167 [AT VI, p. 
240])
F … the answer to the question why God exists should be given not in terms of an 
eficient cause in the strict sense, but simply in terms of the essence or formal cause 
of the thing.　And precisely because in the case of God there is no distinction 
between existence and essence, the formal cause wil be strongly analogous to an efi-
cient cause, and hence can be caled something close to an eficient cause. (CSM I p. 
170 [AT VI, p. 243])
In the passages cited above Descartes concedes that God has no eficient cause in the 
proper sense and that God is not strictly the eficient cause of himself.　Then, may we say that 
this consession of Descartes’ can resolve the conflict existing between Descartes on the one 
hand and Caterus and Arnauld on the other hand about the notion of Causa Sui?　By no means. 
The essential point of their Causa Sui controversy is diferent from the question whether or not 
God may be caled the eficient cause of himself in the proper sense of the term.
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IV
By inquiring Descartes’ text in detail, we can realize that the reason why Descartes con-
cedes that God is not strictly the eficient cause of himself is reduced to his agreeing that the 
notion of eficient causality implies the Distinctness Condition.　Just because this condition 
cannot be deleted from the notion of eficient causality Descartes admits that strictly speaking 
there is no eficient cause of itself.5) However, the question whether or not the eficient causality 
implies the Desctinctness Condition was no important mater for Caterus and Arnauld when 
they objected to Descartes.
Here I would like to atend to Jean-Luc Marion’s argument in his paper “Entre analogie et 
principe de raison: la causa sui” (= Marion, 1994).　According to Marion, “D’Anselme à 
Suarez, l’accord se fait donc sur un principe reçu et commun: «.. nihil potest eficere se»” 
(Marion, 1994, p. 312).　In other words, “Les prédécesseurs de Descartes tiennent donc la 
causa sui impensable” (idem.).　And we find in Suarez’s Disputationes metaphysicae almost 
the same argument as that of Caterus and Arnauld about the Divine Aseity.　Suarez says: 
“Nam quod dicitur ex se vel a se esse, licet positivum hoc esse videatur, tamen solam negatio-
nem addit ipsi enti, nam ens non potest esse a se per positivan originem et emanationem (…) et 
hunc modum exponendi sunt aliqui Sancti, cum dicunt Deum sibi causam sui esse, vel substan-
tiae suae aut sapientiae” (op.cit., p. 311–312).
What matered to Caterus and Arnauld is condensed in this very citation from Suarez.　In 
other words, what they intended to say to Descartes after al was that the Aseity of God (Deus 
esse a see) should not be understood in any positive sense because understanding it so would 
relegate God into the sphere of the Principle of Eficient Causation, that is to say the sphere of 
created things.　On the other hand, Descartes did not show any sign of concession about how 
to understand the Divine Aseity.　Namely, it was Descartes’ firm position that the immense 
essence of God is something positive and that this positive thing is the positive reason why God 
needs no eficient cause in order to exist.　Taking this aspect into consideration, we can clearly 
see that this controversy should not be simplified to a certain sort of concept analysis.　In 
essence they were not concerned about the question whether the eficient causality involves the 
Distinctness Condition or the Temporarity Conditon.　Their essential point of dispute lies in 
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whether the Aseity of the Divine Existence should be understood positively or negatively, and 
on this point Descartes on the one hand and Caterus and Arnauld on the other hand remained as 
far as ever al through the period of their controversy.　Therefore we are totaly unable to imag-
ine that Caterus and Arnauld were satisfied with the replies Descartes showed to them.　The 
fact that Descartes admited that God is not the cause of himself in the proper sense should have 
been no consolation for them.　The reason of this admitance of Descartes’ is, as we have seen 
above, reduced after al to the Distinctness Condition being implied by the notion of eficient 
causality, and either of the Distinctness Condition or the Temporarity Condition should have 
been a subsidiary, if not trivial, mater to Caterus and Arnauld.　The reason why Descartes’ 
argument about the noiton of Causa Sui impressed them as quite scandalous lied in the fact that 
Descartes understood the Divine Aseity positively and hence, in their eyes, religated God to the 
sphere of created things.　Therefore as long as Descartes did not change his view about the 
Divine Aseity, the text and the meaning of his argument should have looked split apart to 
Caterus and Arnauld; that is to say, they should have said to themselves: “True, outwardly 
Descartes denied God being the eficient cause of himself in the proper sense, but that conces-
sion is nothing but a screen for his true intention, and inwardly he afirmed God to be the efi-
cient cause of himself”.
V
Two prominent examples of intense Anti-Cartesian movements in the Netherlands in 1640s 
are the so-caled Utrecht Crisis (1641–3) and Leiden Crisis (1647).　The former was launched 
by the theologian Gysbertus Voetius (1589–1676) and the later by Revius.　One of the Carte-
sian arguments which Revius atacked in Leiden Crisis was about the notion of Causa Sui.
Revius once lived in Deventer, where he met Descartes several times mediated by their 
common friend Henricus Reneri (1593–1639).　Already in the Suarez repurgatus of 1643 he 
had inserted criticisms against Descartes, and in 1647 he started a ful-dress campaign against 
the Cartesian philosophy in a series of disputations organized at Leiden University.　The fourth 
and fifth of the disputations dealed with the notion of Causa Sui, and the gist of the criticism 
developed there was fundamenntaly the same as that of Caterus and Arnauld, that is to say the 
assertion that Descartes considered God as Causa Sui by understanding the Divine Aseity posi-
tively and that this consideration is blasphemous (cf. Revius, 1647, pp. 89–108).
Descartes responded to this criticism of Revius in his Notae in programma of 1648.　
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More specificaly, he annexed to the Notae, which was originaly intended as a thourough-going 
objection to the Programma by his ex-pupil Henricus Regius (1598–1679), a response to 
Revius’ criticism.　I wil cite the relevant passage below.
… I have never writen that God should be caled ‘eficient cause of himself not just in 
a negative sense but also in a positive sense’….　However carefuly he sifts, scans and 
pores over my writings, he wil not find in them anything like this – quite the reverse in 
fact.　Anyone who has read my wrintings, or has any knowledge of me, or at least does 
not think me uterly sily, knows that I am totaly opposed to such extravagant views. 
(CSM I, p. 310 [AT VII-2, pp. 368–369])
In the same year as Descartes’ Notae came out, Revius published the Methodi cartesianae 
consideratio theologica.　With this he intended to criticise Descartes’ Discourse on the Method 
paragraph by paragraph, but in the pages he did not forget to insert again the assertion to the 
efect that Descartes regarded God as Causa Sui by understanding His Aseity in the positive 
sense6).
VI
In 1652, before long after Descartes’ death, Clauberg, one of the representative Cartesians 
of the time, published a voluminous book entitled Defensio cartesiana.　This is a counteratack 
against Revius’ Methodi cartesianae, hence a defense of Descartes’ methodology in particular, 
but we can find in its Chapter 23 a passage to the efect that Descartes never asserted that God 
is efected by himself positively7).　Reacting to the Defensio cartesiana Revius published in 
1653 the Thekel, hoc est levitas defensionis Cartesianae, in which he atacked Clauberg’s 
counteratack by refering to arguments in his own previous writings8).
No doubt Revius was fuly conscious that Descartes denied explicitly God to be the cause 
of himself in the positive sense in the Fourth Set of Replies 9).　Then why did Revius continue 
to object to Clauberg, who atempted to defend Descartes by citing Descartes’ words in his 
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 7) Cf. Clauberg, 1968, I, p. 1014.
 8) Cf. Aza Goudriaan, 2002, p. 57.
 9) On this denial, see e.g. the citation A in Section II of this paper.
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replies to Arnauld? The reason must be that the same gulf between Caterus/Arnauld and Des-
cartes existed also between Revius and Descartes.　In other words, the essential reason why 
Descartes’ argument about the notion of Causa Sui looked scandalous not only to 
Caterus/Arnauld but also to Revius was the one fact that Descartes understood the Divine 
Aseity in the positive sense.　However tanaciouly Descartes might have denied God to be the 
cause of himself in the proper sense, his denial was only a screen in the eyes of Caterus, 
Arnauld and Revius and they considered Descartes to be practicaly afirming God to be the 
cause of himself.　It was quite natural for Clauberg, who was anxious to defend Descartes, to 
fight against them by citing Descartes’ words, but those words meant nothing but a screen for 
Revius and he wanted to assert that he was able to see Descartes’ real intention through that 
screen.　Thus in the Netherlands from the end of 1640s to 1650s the Causa Sui Controversy 
turned into a baren and endless dispute.
It was just at this period that Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) met Cartesianism through the 
contact with Colegiant friends and studied Latin and the New Philosophy at the Latin school 
administrated by Franciscus van den Enden (1602–1674).　On July 27, 1656, Spinoza was 
excommunicated from the Jewish community of Amsterdam on the ground of his “abominable 
heresies” and “monstrous deeds” (Nadler, 1999, p. 120).　Steven Nadler suggested that the 
Anti-Cartesian movement then existing in the Nederlands had to do with Spinoza’s 
excommunication.　Utrecht Crisis occurred in 1643 and Leiden Crisis in 1647.　And accord-
ing to Nadler’s conjection, in 1656 the Dutch Anti-Cartesian movement had its third peak, and 
the Jewish community of Amsterdam had to excommunicate Spinoza in order to demonstrate 
their Anti-Cartesian atitude to the Dutch authorities10).　If this was the case, Spinoza’s excom-
munication may be caled Amsterdam Crisis.　In any case, it is safe to say that at the moment 
of his excommunication Spinoza was fuly aware of the intelectual conditions about Cartesian-
ism of his days.　Also, in Section 92 of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intelect, which 
is now regarded as the earliest work by Spinoza, the author writes: “If the thing is in itself, or, 
as is commonly said, is the cause of itself, then it must be understood through its essence alone” 
(Curley, pp. 38–39)11).　Taking into consideration the expression “as is commonly said”, it is 
quite natural to suppose that Spinoza knew of the Causa Sui Controversy by the end of 1650s.　
Further, it is an obvious fact that Spinoza owned in his library a copy of the Dutch translation of 
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11) O. L.: “si res sit in se, sive, ut vulgo dicitur, causa sui, tum per solam suam essentiam debebit intel-
ligi” (G, I, p. 34).
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Clauberg’s Defensio cartesiana mentioned above12).　Therefore we are able to say with very 
litle fear of mistake that Spinoza watched at point-blank range the Causa Sui Controversy 
which I have just surveyed.
VII
I repeat that Spinoza’s definition of the notion Causa Sui is prima facie strange because it 
seems unnecessary to define that notion.　Those who knew of the Causa Sui Controvery, 
among whom Spinoza himself must be counted as I explained in the preceding section, should 
have known clearly that the notion means an eficient cause of itself (causa eficiens sui ipsius). 
Notwithstanding Spinoza dared to define the notion of Causa Sui.　And what is more perplex-
ing is the fact that the definiens is not “eficient cause of itself (causa eficiens sui ipsius)”.　
How can we understand the true intention of this prima facie strange definition?
First, it is now abundantly clear that Spinoza did not intend to determine the more or less 
lexicographical meaning of the notion of Causa Sui.　The definiens in the actual definition was 
not in accordance with the common sense of those who knew of the Causa Sui Controversy.　
Therefore we must say that Spinoza intended to show more than the common sense meaning of 
the notion of Causa Sui.　Second, the definiens in the actual definition, namely, “that whose 
essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing” means 
nothing but God for al those who engaged in the Causa Sui Controversy.　For example, Des-
cartes says in the Fifth Meditation: “from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, 
it folows that existence is inseparable from God, and hence that he realy exists” (CSM I, p. 46 
[AT VII, p. 67]).　Also, Arnauld says in the Fourth Set of Objections: “it belongs to the 
essence of an infinite being that it exists … no less than it belongs to the essence of a triangle 
to have its three angles equal to two right angles” (CSM II, p. 149 [AT VII, p. 212]).　There-
fore Spinoza must be judged to expose unambiguouly his stance about the essential theme of the 
Causa Sui Controversy, that is to say the aproppriateness of regarding God as the eficient cause 
of himself.　And needless to say, with this definition Spinoza maintains that it is appropriate to 
regard God as the eficient cause of himself.
Spinoza knew that the Causa Sui Controversy turned into a baren dispute in 1650s.　And 
he intended to refuse to take over that barren dispute in his own metaphysical argument.　In 
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other words, he wanted to make his own position as clear as possible about the Causa Sui 
Controversy.　That is why he placed the definition of the notion of Causa Sui at the very begin-
ning of the Ethics and there equated the notion of Causa Sui with a description which desig-
nated nothing but God for al the members who engaged in the Causa Sui Controversy.　In that 
way Spinoza declared that he not only understood the Divine Aseity in the positive sense (like 
Descartes) but also regarded God as the eficient cause of himself in the proper sense (unlike 
Descartes).　Therefore the logical status of this definition is not so much a simple definition as 
an axiom or more specificaly an exposition of a certain metaphysical stance.
Now we are able to realize that Spinoza’s definition of the notion of Causa Sui has both a 
Cartesian sense and a non-Cartesian sense.　Its Cartesian sense is that Spinoza declares that he 
wil folow Descartes in understanding the Divine Aseity positively.　Its non-Cartesian sense is 
that Spinoza declares that he wil make no use of the screen that Arnauld and Revius should 
have felt in Descartes’ argument al through the Causa Sui Controversy.　In Spinoza’s concep-
tion of eficient causality, neither the Temporarity Conditon nor the Distinctness Condition is 
taken into consideration.　God is the eficient cause of himself in the proper sense of the term.　
And that means that the Principle of Eficient Causation is completed after al, because that prin-
ciple now proclaims about everything existing not only that it should be possible to ask about 
the cause of its existence but also that there should be the cause of its existence13).　In this way 
Spinoza’s God, unlike Descartes’, is no more a Being transcending eficient causality.
The fact that Part One of Spinoza’s Ethics has no preface has been somewhat plerplexing 
to Spinoza scholars.　It begins abruptly with the definition of the notion of Causa Sui.　But 
now, it is abundantly clear that the definition is much more than a simple definition.　It is 
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13) The completion of the Principle of Eficient Causation has been implicitly and partly anticipated in 
the Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy.　In the Descartes’ Principles Spinoza reproduces most of 
the axioms given by Descartes in the Geometrical Exposition at the end of the Second Set of Repli
es, and then Spinoza presents Descartes’ Axiom 1 (= Descartes’ Principle of Eficient Causation) as 
Axiom 11.　However, Spinoza’s Axiom 11 is much shorter than Descartes’ Axiom 1.　I wil cite 
both axioms below.　The second sentence in Descartes’ Axiom 1, which qualifies the Principle of 
Eficient Causation explicitly, is completely deleted in Spinoza’s Axiom 11.
Descartes’ Axiom 1: Concerning every existing thing it is possible to ask what it the cause of its 
existence.　This question may even be asked concerning God, not because he needs any cause in 
order to exist, but because the immensity of his nature is the cause or reason why he needs no 
cause in order to exist. (CSM I, p. 116 [AT VI, pp. 164–165])
Spinoza’s Axiom 11: Nothing exists of which it cannot be asked, what is the cause, or reason, 
why it existes.　See Descartes’ Axiom 1. (Curley, 1985, p. 246 [G I, p. 158])
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rather a decisive exposition of a certain metaphysical stance.　And it wil not be too much to 
say that the definition is so rich in metaphysical implication that it may compensate, partly at 
least, for the very absence of a preface.
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